Cheikh Farid Elias El KhazenDr. Farid El Khazen
Cheikh Farid Elias El Khazen (PROFILE)
Written by
Saturday, 7 May 2005 00:00
According to official results of The 2005 Elections in Mount Lebanon , the list of General Michel Aoun scored a sweeping victory in the regions Keserwan and Jbeil.
The results also show that Cheikh Farid Elias El Khazen , a member of The Khazen Family scored 56719 votes , being fourth on Aoun's list .
The Johns Hopkins University, The Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS). M.A. in International Relations (1982). Concentration in International Economics and Middle East Studies.
Cornell University
S.W. Missouri State University
B.S. in Economics (1980). Concentration in Economics.
American University of Beirut (1976-1978)
Concentration in Architecture and Social Science.
PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE:
American University of Beirut
1. Professor and Chair. Department of Political Studies and Public Administration. Fall 2000-present
2. Associate Professor. Department of Political Studies and Public Administration. Fall 1993-Spring 2000. 3. Assistant Professor. Department of Political Studies and Public Administration. Fall 1988-Spring 1993. 4. Full-time teaching. Fall 1987-Spring 1988. 5. Part-time teaching. Fall 1986-Spring 1987.
6. Taught graduate and undergraduate courses in Comparative Politics, International Relations, Middle East Politics, American Government, the Arab-Israeli Conflict, and Lebanese Politics.
PUBLICATIONS: BOOKS, CHAPTERS, & ARTICLES:
2005
Forthcoming edited book on the Resilience of Authoritarian Regimes in the Arab World, to be published by Routledge.
2004
2003
2002
2001
2000
1998
1997
1996
1995
1994
1993
1992
"Lebanon's Communal Elite-Mass Politics: The Institutionalization of Disnitegration," The Beirut Review (Spring 1992): 53-82.
1991
1990
Min Beirut Ila 'Awgar: al-Siyasa al-Amirigiyya Bayn al-Waqi'wa Hajis alMu'amara", al-Difa' al-Watani, 3 (August 1990): 99-117. Article on American foreign policy.
1989
"Al-'Alagat al-Lubnaniya al-Amirigiya fi Siyasat al-Tawazun al-Iglimi, 1975-1989," al Difa' al-Watani, 1 (November 1989): 10-29. Article on Lebanese-American relations, 1975-1989.
1988
1987
"The Rise and Fall of the PLO," The National Interest, 4 (Winter 1987-1988): 39-47.
1986
1985
"The Lebanese Economy After a Decade Turmoil," American-Arab Affairs, No 12 (Spring 1985): 72-84. 5
EDITORIALS & ESSAYS:
ACADEMIC ACTIVITES:
OTHER ACTIVITES:
LANGUAGE SKILLS:
Fluency in three languages: Arabic, English, and French
Contributed publications in the three languages.
LECTURES & CONFERENCES (SELECTIVE):
1- Centre for Lebanese Studies, Oxford, United Kingdom. Workshop on "Current Research on Lebanon." September 15-17, 1986. 2- Centre for Lebanese Studies, Oxford, United Kingdom. Conference on "Consensus and Conflict in Lebanon: 1830-1975". September 10-12, 1987.
3- The Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, Washington, D.C. Lecture on "Lebanon in the Aftermath of the Failure of the Tripartite Accord". March 17, 1987.
4- The Ditchley Foundation, Oxfordshire, United Kingdom. Conference on "The Gulf War, Lebanon, Palestine: A Review of Middle East Crises and Prospects". September 25-27, 1987.
5- The Lebanese Foundation for Permanent Civil Peace. International Conference on "state-building." Ayia Napa, Cyprus. May 11-15, 1988.
6- The Middle East Institute, Washington D.C. Lecture on Lebanon's presidential elections. July 22, 1988.
7- The Lebanese Foundation for Permanent Civil Peace. Conference on the state of research in the social sciences in Lebanon. Ayia Napa, Cyprus. September 5-7, 1993.
8- The Lebanese Foundation for Peace. Conference on the Arab-Israeli Conflict and the Peace Process. February 25-27, 1994.
9- Foreign Policy School of the University of Otago, New Zealand. "The Middle East in the Post-Cold War Era." International Conference. Presented a paper on "Lebanon and the Peace Process." May 13-16, 1994.
10- National Democratic Institute for International Affairs and the New Jordan Research Center. International Conference on "Current Trends in Electoral Systems". Amman, Jordan. Presented a paper on Arab Electoral Politics. September 27-29, 1994. 11- The Ford Foundation, Cairo, Egypt. "Workshop on the Comparative Analysis of Electoral Processes in the Middle East". November 28-30, 1994.
12- Centre for Lebanese Studies (Oxford) and Electoral Reform Society (London). Workshop on the "1996 Election in Lebanon". January 19-21, 1996.
13- Refugee Studies Programme, Oxford University. International conference on the Palestinians in Lebanon. Presented a paper "The Settlement of Palestinian Refugees in Lebanon. September 27-30, 1996.
14- The Middle East Council of Churches, Cairo, Egypt. Conference on Communal Coexistence in Egypt, Lebanon and Palestine. March 22-24, 1997.
15- Royal United Services Institute for Defense Studies, London, UK. Lecture on "Postwar Lebanon, 1990-1997". August 7, 1997.
16- Royal Institute for Inter-Faith Studies, Amman, Jordan. Conference on "the Arab Christian Today." September 15-17, 1997.
17- Adenauer Foundation and the European Union. Presented a paper in International Conference on "Cooperation in Establishing Security in the Mediterranean Region," Malta. November 27-30, 1997.
18- lbn K.ha'ldun Center for Development, Cairo, Egypt. Conference on Minorities in the Arab World. May 31-June 2, 1998. Presented a paper on election studies in Palestine.
19- Justice and Peace Commission, The Vatican, Rome. International Conference on Human Rights. July 1-4, 1998.
20- Ford Foundation and Ibn Khaldun Center for Development, Egypt. Workshop on Civil Society and Political Parties in the Arab World. December 5-8, 1998.
21- Center for Asian Studies, University of Cairo, Egypt. Conference on The Peace Process: the Arab-Israeli Conflict and South Asia. Presented a paper on the peace process. February 11-14, 1999.
22- Middle East Research Services, Cairo, Egypt. Conference on Globalization and the Middle East. Presented a paper on American Foreign Policy. February 22-24, 1999.
23- University of Jordan, Amman. Workshop on Opinion Leaders and Political Parties in the Arab World. April 4-5, 1999.
24- Ethnic Studies Network, Fourth International Conference, Moscow, Russia. Presented a a paper on state and society in postwar Lebanon. June 8-11, 1999.
25- University of Cairo, Faculty of Economics and Political Science, Egypt. First International Conference on Parliamentary Studies. October 14-15, 1999.
26- The Royal Institute of International Affairs (London) and the Lebanese Center for Policy Studies. Conference on "Lebanon and the Middle East Peace Process." Presented a paper on the Palestinian refugees and the peace process. February 22, 2000.
27- The Arab Institute for Studies and Communication and Ibn Khaldun Center, Egypt. Workshop on Political Parties in the Arab World. Presented a paper on political parties and democracy in postwar Lebanon. February 25-27, 2000.
28- The Royal Institute of International Affairs, London. International Conference on the "Refugee Issue in the Middle East Peace Process". March 4-5, 2000.
29- The Royal Institute of International Affairs (London), and the Center for Lebanese Studies (Oxford). Workshop on the Refugee problem in the Peace Process, Minster Lovell. July 22-23, 2000.
30- European University Institute, Robert Schuman Center for Advanced Studies, Second Mediterranean Social and Political Research Meeting, Workshop on Regimes and Regime Change in the Southern Mediterranean, Florence (Italy), March 21-25, 2001.
31- Seventh Pugwash Workshop on the Middle East: Palestine, Israel and the Middle East Peace Process, Alexandria, Egypt, April 26-29, 2001.
32- The Royal Institute of International Affairs (London) and Centre for Lebanese Studies (Oxford), Workshop on the Middle East Peace Process: Taking Stock, MiD ster Lovell, May 5-6, 2001.
33- The Michel Chiha Foundation and the Center for Behavioral Research at the American University of Beirut. Presented a paper on Political Parties in Postwar Lebanon. May 18-19,2001
34- Fifth International Conference of the Ethnic Studies Network, Londonderry, Northern Ireland. Presented a paper on Lebanon: "From Violence to Politics". June 27-30, 2001.
35- The New Jordan Center (Amman). Presented a paper on the political elites in Lebanon. November 12-15,2001.
36- The Center for strategic Studies, University of Jordan and Al-Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies (Cairo), Workshop in Amman on the Arab League Summitry. February 9-11,2002.
37- Holy Spirit University (Kaslik), Lecture on Lebanon and the regional politics since the events of September 11. March 19, 2002.
38- Universite Saint Joseph (Beirut), Lecture on Postwar Lebanon, April 11, 2002.
39- The Royal Institute of International Affairs (London), Workshop on the Middle East Crisis, April 27-28, 2002.
40- United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) and LCPS (Lebanon), Workshop on Social Science Strategy for the Arab states Region, May 14-15, 2002.
41- The Crown Prince Court Research and Studies Division, Abu Dhabi, "Recent Developments in the Arab World and their Impact on the Region", May19, 2002. Presented a paper on Syria and Lebanon.
42- The First World Congress for Middle Eastern Studies, Mainz Germany. Presented a paper in a panel on postwar Lebanon, September 8-13, 2002.
43- Center for Comparative Study of Law and Society. Presented a paper in a workshop on Electoral Laws in Postwar Societies, Beirut, September 27-28, 2002.
44- The 4th' Mediterranean Development Forum, Amman, Jordan, October 6-9, 2002. Discussant of papers in workshop on local government in the MENA region.
45- University of Malta and University Federico II (Naples). International Conference on "Human Rights and Cultural Identities in the Mediterranean Area" Naples (Italy), January 30-31, 2003.
46- Universite La Sagesse (Beirut). Presented a paper on the Functions of Elections in Postwar Lebanon, February 27-28, 2003 47- The Royal Institute of International Affairs and the Center for Lebanese Studies (Oxford), Workshop on the Middle East Peace Process, Minster Lovell, United Kingdom, May 7-9, 2003.
48- Assemblee des Patriarches et Eveques Catholiques au Liban, Lecture on Lebanese emigration, November 11, 2003.
49- UNDP Workshop on Administrative Decentralization in Lebanon, Presented a paper on the linkages between administrative decentralization, municipal, and election laws, October 15, 2003.
50- University of Malta, International Conference on Human Rights and Asylum Seekers in the Mediterranean, November 20, 2003.
51- University of the Holy Spirit, lecture on Church and politics, December 16, 2003.
52- Gulf Research center, Dubai, Workshop on the Role of the European Union in the Gulf Region, January 7-8, 2004.
53- The Brookings Institution (Washington, D.C.), US-Islamic World Forum, Paperlist on US Public Diplomacy, January 10-11, 2004, held in Doha, Qatar.
54- Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation (TESEV), International Conference on Civil Response to Global Terrorism, Istanbul, Feb. 28-March 1, 2004.
55- European University Institute, Fifth Mediterranean Social and Political Research Meeting, Florence-Montecatini Terme, March 24-28, 2004. Workshop co-director and paper presenter on Authoritarianism in the Arab world.
56- The Royal Institute of International Affairs (London) and the Center for Lebanese Studies (Oxford), Workshop on Regional Developments in the Middle East, Minster Lovell, United Kingdom, April 19-20, 2004.
57- The Cultural Foundation, Abu Dhabi, and the AUB Alumni Association (Abu Dhabi), lecture on Arab Politics in the aftermath of the Iraq war, May 2, 2004.
58- The UCLA Burkle Center for International Relations, Mideast Regional Security Workshop. Presented a paper on Political and Security Change in Postwar Lebanon, Amman, May 17-20, 2004.
59- Department of Political Studies and Public Administration (AUB) and the Royal Institute of International Affairs (London), Seminar on Policy Agendas, Conflicts and Fallout in the Middle East, Beirut, June 8, 2004.
60- The UCLA Burkle Center for International Relations, Mideast and Regional Security Workshop. Jordan, September 9-12, 2004.
61- Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and Gulf Research Center, Wrokshop on Political Reform in the GCC states: Current Situation and Future Prospects, Dubai, September 23-24, 2004.
Interviews and commentaries given to international and local media over the last ten years. International Media include: BBC, CNN, ABC, National Public Radio (USA), Radio France Internationale, Radio Monte Carlo, Voice of America, Al-Jazeera, Nippon Television Network (Japan), Australian Broadcasting Corporation, The Washington Post, The New York Times, The New Yorker, The Economist, Newsweek, The Christian Science Monitor, The Times, The Guardian, Los Angeles Times, The Washington Times, The Boston Globe, The Sunday Telegraph, The Philadelphia Inquirer, The Baltimore Sun, San Francisco Chronicle, Houston Chronicle, La Reppublica, El Pais, Frankfurter Allgemeine, Associated Press, Reuters, National Geographic, and others.
Regional and Local Media include: Al-Ahram Weekly (Egypt), al-Siyasa (Kuwait), al-Ra'y al Am (Kuwait), al-Anba' (Kuwait), al-Sharq al-Awsat (Saudi Arabia). In Lebanon, al-Nahar, Daily Star, L'Orient LeJour, al-Safir, al-Hayat, Magazine, alMustagbal, al-Anwar, and others..
Political parties in postwar Lebanon: parties in search of partisans
Written by
Friday, 23 July 2004 00:00
AL Academic AT Political parties in postwar AU Farid el Khazen CT The DE Political parties DE Political parties_Lebanon DP Autumn 2003 v57 i4 p605(20) GN Lebanon_Political aspects IS 4 LW 605(20) ND 20040430 PB The Middle East Institute PT Magazine/Journal PT Refereed RM COPYRIGHT 2004 Gale Group SN 0026-3141 SU Political parties SU Political parties_Lebanon SU Forecasts and trends SU Political aspects VO 57 ZZ Source: The Middle East Journal, Autumn 2003 v57 i4 p605(20). Title: Political parties in postwar partisans. Author: Farid el Khazen Subjects: Political parties Political parties - Lebanon Locations: Lebanon Electronic Collection: A111162255 RN: A111162255 Full Text COPYRIGHT 2003 The Middle East Institute This article examines the performance of political parties in postwar Lebanon against the benchmark of parties in the prewar period. Parties turned into militias during Lebanon's fifteen-year war and reverted to their party status with the ending of the war in 1990. In postwar Lebanon parties face several problems partly generated by their inability to recover from wartime practices and partly because of the built-in limitations in the political system inhibiting competitive politics. Some parties are banned; others have access to political and financial rewards and thus have a stake in preserving the status quo. In this sense, parties are performing functions similar to those performed by parties in authoritarian regimes. ********** Political parties have been active in Lebanon ever since the state was formed in the early 1920s. The "first generation" of political parties emerged during the French Mandate (1920-1943) and was followed by a "second generation" after independence in 1943, and a "third generation" in wartime Lebanon (1975-1990). From independence until the outbreak of war, the influence of political parties was continuously on the rise in local and national politics, reaching a peak in the first half of the 1970s. In the 1972 parliamentary elections--the last held before the outbreak of war--the seven political parties represented in parliament made up over 30% of parliamentary seats. Lebanon does not have a party system, as in the case of two-party or multi-party systems in functioning democracies. The political process is centered on party-based politics as well as on non-partisan "independent" politicians. Although no party in Lebanon reached power and ruled as parties do in parliamentary systems, parties have shaped parliamentary debates and participated in government, and party leaders, particularly those of established parties, are influential political figures. Unlike parties in Arab countries, Lebanon's parties have represented a wide spectrum of political, communal, and ideological platforms reflecting the diverse political landscape both in Lebanon and in its Arab regional order. (1) With no authoritarian state in Lebanon, no ruling party, and no official state ideology, parties have greatly benefited from Lebanon's openness and competitive political process. Parties were able to express views and propagate ideologies, particularly nationalist parties, in ways that were not possible in the largely one-party and/or one-man pattern of rule in the Arab world. Despite the banning of some political parties in Lebanon with leftist and nationalist leanings, especially in the 1950s and 1960s, these parties were able to organize, attract new recruits, and even participate in parliamentary elections. Lebanon's parties, however, were not without limitations and problems: they have generally reflected the communal nature of society and few were able to overcome the confessional barrier. As for secular-oriented parties, they shared a rigid political platform and were subject to various political and ideological influences emanating from Arab politics. In general, parties have failed to promote national integration and were not able to establish mechanisms for cooperation--except on election day through the formation of temporary electoral alliances. Common to all parties was the absence of internal democratic practice. The internal organization, belief-system, and power structure of parties were not conducive to democratic practice, transparency, and accountability. (2) Parties have also nurtured the personality cult of the party founder and/or leader, and few were able to maintain cohesion and abide by their original political platform beyond the founder's lifetime. Another feature shared by parties in Lebanon concerns their involvement in armed conflict. Most parties were predisposed politically and ideologically to transform themselves into militia forces in crisis situations linked to regional turmoil. This occurred in the six-month crisis in 1958 and, more recently, in Lebanon's fifteen-year war. On the eve of the war in 1975, all active parties--with the exception of the National Bloc Party led by Raymond Edde--acquired weapons and party members underwent military training as part of the military mobilization that culuminated in war. PARTIES AND SOCIETY The origins of political parties in Lebanon are similar to those of their counterparts in other countries, both Western and non-Western. (3) Parties grew from two sources: (i) institutional (or internal), that is, from within government institutions, usually electoral politics and the legislative process; (ii) external (developmental or crisis-situation) associated with the process of social change and modernization (urbanization, mass education, economic development, conflict). Parties like the Constitutional Bloc Party, the National Bloc Party, and the National Liberal Party emerged out of parliamentary coalitions, while the founding of parties like the Kata'ib (Kataeb, Phalanges) Party, the Syrian Social Nationalist Party (SSNP), the Lebanese Communist Party (LCP), and the Progressive Socialist Party (PSP) was due to various political, ideological, and social factors. (4) Lebanon's parties have mirrored societal cleavages (political, confessional, ideological) and elite rivalries; they vary in size, influence, and representation across Lebanon's regions. While some parties have been confined to a particular community, region, and even to a locality in the city, others have a broader base and cater to a national audience. Lebanon's major communities have been associated with one or more parties. Maronite and Druze partisan politics (Qaysi versus Yemeni) had roots in the Imara (1516-1842) and Mutasarrifiya (1861-1914) periods in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries respectively, thus preceding modern political parties. In post-1920 Lebanon, the Maronite community identified with parties espousing different political and ideological platforms while the Druze community was largely associated with the Progressive Socialist Party founded in the late 1940s and led by Kamal Jumblatt until his assassination in 1977. (5) The Sunni community has generally identified with parties with an Arab nationalist orientation both before and after independence. It was not until the early 1970s that the Shi'i community identified with parties of its own: the Movement of the Deprived, subsequently Amal, and Iranian-backed Hizballah a decade later. (6) By contrast, leftist and nationalist parties, particularly the SSNP and the Lebanese Communist Party, were not associated with any particular community and/ or region. As for the Armenian community, it had its own parties which catered to Armenian communal interests and concerns. Except in parliamentary elections, Armenian parties were largely detached from the political process. PHASES OF PARTY DEVELOPMENT Political parties in Lebanon have evolved in five phases: (1) The French mandate period (1920-1943) prior to independence; (2) The post-independence period from 1943 to 1970; (3) The pre-war period from 1970-75, marked by unprecedented party activism; (4) The war period (1975-1990), which generated a drastic transformation in the conduct and objectives of political parties; (5) The post-war period from 1990 to the present. Each phase had its own characteristics regarding the functions and role of political parties in relation to both state and society. In the mandate period, two types of parties emerged: ideological parties (the LCP, the SSNP, and the Kata'ib Party), and elite-based parties "partis de personnalites", according to Maurice Duverger) (7) which operated more like loose political coalitions than as organized and disciplined parties (the National Bloc and the Constitutional Bloc). Of the ideological parties, the LCP (initially the Syrian-Lebanese Communist party led by Khalid Bakdash) subscribed to Soviet communism, while the SSNP and the Kata'ib Party espoused two radically different nationalist platforms, both opposed to Arab nationalism. The SSNP advocated Syrian nationalism and called for the formation of Greater Syrian and the Kata'ib Party subscribed to Lebanese nationalism within the boundaries of the newly-formed state. Of the elite based parties, the National Bloc and Constitutional Bloc were led by two Maronite politicians, Emile Edde and Bechara el-Khoury, although these two parties had allies and supporters from all communities. While ideological parties in the mandate period were on the fringe of domestic politics and elite rivalries, and had a narrow power base (the SSNP was banned by French authorities in the 1930s), party-based politics identified with established communal leaders. Much of the politics of that period hinged on inter- and intra-elite rivalries, particularly competition between Maronite politicians for the presidency, Maronite-Sunni differences over Lebanon's Arabism and relations with Syria, the positions of established leaders toward the French mandate, and the struggle for independence. (9) The post-independence period witnessed the emergence of new parties: the Najjada Party, the Progressive Socialist Party in the late 1940s, the National Liberal Party in the late 1950s, and Arab nationalist parties (founded outside Lebanon) in the 1950s and 1960s (the Arab Nationalist Movement, the Ba'th Party, and Nasirite parties). Party-based politics in the 1940s was largely a continuation of the politics that prevailed in the mandate period. The 1950s, however, witnessed change, as parties became better organized and more involved in Lebanese politics both in its internal and external dimensions. The polarization induced by the Cold War and by the 1956 Suez war at the height of Nasirite influence in pan-Arab politics forced politicians and political parties to take a stand on the issues of the day: American-Soviet rivalry, Western-sponsored defense pacts, and Arab nationalist politics. Several parties took part in the armed conflict in 1958 and the country was divided between the pro-Nasir camp and the pro-Western Arab camp, then led by Hashimite-ruled Iraq. THE HEYDAY OF POLITICAL PARTIES The third phase (1970-1975), which immediately preceded the outbreak of war, was unique in the history of party politics in pre-war Lebanon. Over 15 political parties and groupings of all persuasions were active and influential: parties of Left and Right, confessional and secular, ideological and non-ideological, radical and moderate. Parties were engaged in large scale mobilization, recruitment, and propaganda activities across the country. This period was marked by two developments: the political assertion of leftist parties (the "old" and the New Left) and the Palestine Liberation Organization's political and military activism in Lebanon in the aftermath of the Arab defeat in the 1967 Arab-Israeli war. PLO-generated radicalism in the first half of the 1970s overlapped with the entry of Lebanese politics into the age of ideology and mass politics. In many ways, Lebanon's political scene resembled the era of the 1960s in Western countries. (10) Since the late 1960s, leftist parties expanded rapidly within all communities and were influenced by revolutionary movements in Third World countries and by student activism in Western countries. This was a time when Lebanon witnessed the rise of radical parties espousing various ideological platforms: Marxist, Leninist, Maoist, Trotskyite. In the eyes of the more militant parties of the New Left, represented by the Organization of Communist Action (founded in 1971), the Lebanese Communist Party looked like a traditional establishment party. Arab nationalist parties were equally active, notably the pro-Iraqi Ba'th Party, which won a seat in the 1972 parliamentary elections. So did a Nasirite candidate in Beirut. Also, the SSNP made political headway during that period, but it was a different party, both politically and ideologically, from that of the 1940s and 1950s. Released from jail in 1969-70, after serving a sentence since 1963 following the party's abortive coup against President Fouad Chehab, SSNP party leaders began to reorganize the party and turned it into a "left wing" party identifying with Arab causes. (11) During that period Lebanon's labor unions associated with political parties were mobilized and highly politicized. In the 1970s, the social question acquired an unprecedented ideological dimension and a political platform never experienced before in Lebanese politics. The novel development in the 1970s was the political activism of university students affiliated with parties. Never before did Lebanon witness the intensity and magnitude of politicization of university students as in the first half of the 1970s. (12) The first half of the 1970s was also marked by the militarization of Lebanese politics. The PLO's armed presence divided Lebanese parties and public into two camps: one opposed to the PLO's armed presence and to PLO-Israeli warfare in south Lebanon, the other giving it unconditional support. By the mid-1970s, domestic Lebanese politics overlapped with that of the PLO. This was the case in the three major crises that paralyzed government in 1969, 1973, and 1975, in which the PLO was deeply involved both politically and militarily. The divide continued to widen and no middle ground solution was possible. In the end, armed conflict was inevitable, for coexistence between an expanding Palestinian revolutionary movement backed by Arab regimes and the Lebanese state was, at best, temporary. THE WAR YEARS: 1975-1990 In the war years, political parties were the most predisposed and the most well-equipped actors to engage in armed conflict. The turning point for the militarization of parties--that is, the acquisition of weapons and the organized training of party members and supporters--was in 1973, following the armed confrontation between the Lebanese army and the PLO. Divided on the PLO armed presence as well as on ideological and political grounds, political parties mirrored these divisions. In the Christian camp, weapons were needed to defend communal interests and face the PLO-Leftist-Muslim alliance, while in the Muslim-Leftist camp weapons were needed to defend the PLO and to reform the political system. As war broke out, parties quickly turned into militias. (13) They mobilized the youth, attracted new recruits, and provided the political, military, and propaganda infrastructure for warfare. And with the institutionalization of the war system, parties/militias emerged as the main beneficiaries of the war both politically and financially. Militia leaders were better off managing conflict rather than finding ways to end it. While the first phase of the war in 1975-76 was fought by volunteers on both sides and the perception of communal and/or political threat was high, the subsequent phases--from 1977 to the Israeli invasion in 1982, and from that date until 1990 were fought by organized militias (in addition to the PLO, Syria, and Israel) with full-time fighters receiving salaries and other benefits. As the war generated a momentum of its own along with its rewards for the protagonists, political parties/militias became the most effective "lobby" for its prolongation. Following the second collapse of state institutions (government and army) in the aftermath of the 1982 Israeli invasion (the first was in 1975-76), militias were the de facto holders of power in the areas they controlled: the (Christian) Lebanese Forces in "East Beirut" and (Shi'i) Amal, the (Druze) Progressive Socialist Party (PSP), and other parties in "West Beirut." (14) The first major attempt to integrate the militia order in the state was in December 1985, when Lebanon's three major militias--the Lebanese Forces, Amal, and the PSP--signed an agreement to end the war. Presented as a platform for reform, the Syrian-brokered Tripartite Agreement aimed to institutionalize Syrian domination over Lebanon through militia rule. Opposed by Lebanese Forces military commander, Samir Geagea [Ja'ja'] and by president Amin Gemayel [Jumayyil], the Tripartite Agreement collapsed and Elie Hobeiqa, the Lebanese Forces intelligence chief who brokered the agreement with Damascus, was ousted from "East Beirut." (15) As the war continued, militias became increasingly dependent on external parties for support (PLO, Syria, Israel, Iran). The war also led to the fragmentation of militias and to bloody confrontations among militias sharing similar objectives and within the same community and/or region. The militias' "civil wars" resulted in thousands of civilian casualties and in massive destruction of property. Moreover, some militias ceased to operate during the war, notably the Fatah-backed Sunni militia Al-Murabitun, while new parties/militias were formed. The two main newcomers were Islamist parties: Shi'i-based Party of God (Hizballah) and Sunni-based Harakat al-Tawhid (Unity Movement) led by Shaykh Sa'id Sha'ban. While the power base of Harakat al-Tawhid was confined to the northern city of Tripoli--and was backed first by PLO Leader Yasir 'Arafat and, after the latter's ouster from Tripoli in 1983, by Syria--Hizballah had much greater influence and support. Although Hizballah's roots go back to the Da'wa Party in Iraq, its official founding was in 1985, following the announcement of its charter identifying itself as an Islamist party committed to the establishment of an Islamic state in Lebanon and espousing Ruhollah Khomeini's Wilayat al-Faqih. (16) Hizballah's initial involvement in the war was in 1982 during the Israeli invasion. Armed and funded by Iran, Hizballah clashed with leftist parties and was on bad terms with Syria at a time when the relationship between Amal, led by Nabih Berri since 1980, and Damascus was at its peak, particularly in the mid-1980s. Having succeeded in attracting an increasingly large Shi'i following, intially from within the ranks of Amal, Hizballah became Amal's main rival in the Shi'i community. Armed confrontations between Amal and Hizballah in the late 1980s were ended by an active intervention by Syria and Iran. Most opposed to a political settlement to end the war--from the first attempt in the February 1976 Constitutional Document to the November 1989 Ta'if Agreement--were political parties/militias; they had more interests at stake to preserve in war-torn Lebanon than powerless politicians not affiliated with parties. The ending of the war in Fall 1990--preceded by two successive wars in "East Beirut" in 1989-1990 between the Lebanese Forces and General Aoun and between the latter and Syria occurred against the will of the militias and their leaders. (17) POLITICAL PARTIES IN POSTWAR LEBANON The transition from war to peace was abrupt and involved no rehabilitation process for political parties and for the "war elites" who changed hats overnight. The war did not end with a peace conference that brought together the protagonists under international auspices, as in the case of other protracted conflicts. The closest substitute to a peace conference was the Ta'if Agreement, (18) the implementation of which sparked another round of warfare. War ended with an act of war, when General Michel Aoun, heading an interim cabinet, was removed from office by Syrian forces assisted by Lebanese Army units loyal to the Ta'if government. (19) With the ending of hostilities, political parties, like other political actors, entered the postwar phase of Lebanese politics. Militias had to adapt to this new state of affairs and quickly revert to their political party status. In March 1991, the government formally announced the dissolution of the militias in accordance with the Ta'if Agreement, and militias were given until the end of April to hand in their heavy weapons and to close their military and training centers. (20) All militias, large and small, were dissolved except Hizballah and, to a lesser extent, Amal. Hizballah maintained a sophisticated military force of several thousand men and was engaged in warfare against the Israeli army and the Israeli-backed South Lebanon Army in south Lebanon. Similarly, Palestinian factions, especially those based in camps in the south, were not disarmed; on the contrary, they were given a new lease on life in the absence of a political decision to allow the Lebanese Army to enter the camps in 1991. Loyal to Syria and 'Arafat, Palestinian factions have been involved in recent years in violent clashes in and outside the camps. The most targeted militia force in Syrian-controlled postwar Lebanon has been the Lebanese Forces, in addition to other Christian-based parties. The Lebanese Forces were transformed in 1993 into a political party, officially called the Lebanese Forces Party. But less than a year after its formation, the Lebanese Forces Party was banned by the Lebanese government and its leader Samir Geagea was detained in 1994, following the bombing of a church, of which he was later acquitted, and has received several life sentences for war-related crimes. Although without Geagea's support the Ta'if Agreement might not have seen the light, his detention since 1994 has been attributed to his lukewarm involvement in the political process and, more importantly, to his antagonism to Syria during the war years. (21) POLITICAL PARTIES AND THE POSTWAR POLITICAL PROCESS Political parties in postwar Lebanon face several problems emanating from three overlapping sources: first, problems generated by the political order since the end of the war in 1990; second, problems emanating from society, that is, the way in which the public relates to political parties and to their role in and outside government; third, internal rivalries and problems of organizational and political nature. Although these problems spring from different sources and have different dynamics, they are mutually reinforcing in terms of their overall impact on parties and the political process. In prewar Lebanon, what enabled political parties to perform functions similar to those performed in democratic regimes--namely, political representation, elite recruitment, mobilization of the electorate, policy formulation--and influence the decision-making process as parties in power or in the opposition was the absence of an authoritarian state. Had Lebanon been ruled by one party or by a regime that tolerated only those parties that were subservient to government authorities, political parties would have fared no better than parties in authoritarian regimes as in Lebanon's regional order. In postwar Lebanon, the margin for freedom and tolerance is no doubt narrower than that of the prewar period and, over the last decade, that margin has been shrinking and the political system has gradually acquired features of an authoritarian state. This is particularly reflected in parliamentary elections which have been held every four years since 1992 but have had little bearing on government policy. (22) The problem is compounded by the fact that final decisions in domestic and foreign policy are made in Damascus and implemented in Beirut. (23) For instance, foreign policy--an important component of the political agenda of any political party--is governed by the notion of "privileged relations" between Lebanon and Syria, which means that Lebanon's foreign policy should always concur with that of Syria--the so-called "concurrent path" (talazum al-masarayn). More constraining to political parties is the threshold of tolerance of party activism determined by the state. Parties can be divided into three categories: "loyal" parties, that is, parties having permanent representation in cabinet and parliament, such as the SSNP, Amal, the Ba'th Party, the PSP, and Al-Wa'd Party led by the late Elie Hobeiqa; parties that are allowed to operate but have no representation in cabinet or parliament, such as the Lebanese Communist Party and the National Bloc Party; and parties that are banned, such as the Lebanese Forces Party and the Pro-Iraqi Ba'th Party, or are systematically targeted by government authorities either directly or indirectly, such as the National Liberal Party, the Kata'ib Party (until 2002) and the Independent National Current led by General Michel Aoun ['Awn]. The common denominator shared by the parties of the latter category in addition to the National Bloc Party is their vocal opposition to Syrian hegemony over Lebanon and their call to redress the imbalance in Syrian-Lebanese relations. (see Table 1) While problems emanating from the political system are a function of internal and external circumstances, the gap separating political parties from society is more difficult to bridge. Parties have maintained a political discourse that is little different from that of the war, and that has not helped to improve their credibility beyond the small circle of partisans. Moreover, parties involved in the war have not been able to recover from the negative militia image they acquired in fifteen years of violence. Although some parties sought to improve their image, others, particularly parties that have access to power and privileges in the postwar period, have had no incentive to do so. (24) In fact, militia leaders of the 1970s and 1980s are now leading government officials reaping the fruits of their deeds in the war years. For example, Nabih Berri, the leader of the Amal militia since 1980, has been Speaker of parliament since 1992. Similarly, Walid Jumblatt, the leader of the PSP since 1977 and other members of his party have been permanent members of cabinet since 1990. As for the SSNP, which shunned political office since its founding in the early 1930s, party leaders and members have been represented in all cabinets and parliaments since 1990. The third type of problems faced by political parties is internal. Here the distinction between banned or targeted parties and "loyal" parties is necessary. Needless to say, the freedom to organize, campaign, and recruit new members for parties in power is obviously much larger than that allowed for the other parties. While in the first half of the 1970s parties reached a peak in terms of their ability to expand and attract new members, especially among the youth and across Lebanon's communities and regions, in the 1990s the trend has been reversed. With the exception of a few parties, notably Hizballah (discussed below), parties have not been able to attract new recruits in large numbers as in previous periods. And those parties that did better than others in this regard, the majority of the new recruits have family ties to party members, a phenomenon called by Shawqat Shtai "biological reproduction." (25) Internal divisions are another problem facing political parties. While several parties witnessed fragmention, especially following the disappearance of the party founder (the SSNP following the execution of Antoun Saadeh in 1949; the National Liberal Party after the death of Camille Chamoun in 1985; Amal after the disappearance of Imam Musa al-Sadr in 1978), the party that has been beset by internal divisions in recent years is the Kata'ib Party. It was deeply factionalized during the war prior to the death of the party founder Pierre Gemayel in 1984, but the divide between the Kata'ib and the Lebanese Forces led by Gemayel's son, Bashir, became irreversible after the elder Gemayel's death. In the 1990s, the Kata'ib underwent further divisions as party leader George Saade opted for accommodation with government and maintained ties with Damascus, while two other factions, one led by former party head Elie Karame and another by Lebanese Forces Leader Samir Geagea, opposed Saade's policy and objectives. The power struggle within the Kata'ib Party continued after Saade's death in 1998 and was intensified following the return of former president Amin Gemayel to Lebanon in mid-2000 from a twelve-year exile in Paris. The election of Karim Pakradouni as head of the party in 2002 widened the internal rift. As Pakradouni drew the party closer to President Emile Lahoud and to Damascus, he clashed with Amin Gemayel and his supporters, and that led to the de facto emergence of two Kata'ib Parties: the "official" party loyal to Lahoud and hoping to benefit politically for its stand, and the other supported by the party's traditional base in the opposition. The Kata'ib Party's dilemma in postwar Lebanon is rather unique: it was one of the few Christian-backed parties that supported the Ta'if Agreement at the height of General Aoun's popularity and influence in "East Beirut," but was not rewarded for its deed by government authorities and/or by Syria; (26) it also supported government policies and established ties with Damascus but alienated a large segment of its supporters who do not share the views and the policies of the present party leadership. Another party marginalized by the postwar political order is the Lebanese Communist Party. Unlike the Kata'ib Party, the LCP was Syria's ally during the war, especially after the departure of the PLO from Beirut and Tripoli in 1982-1983, and it supported the 1985 Syrian-sponsored, militia-based Tripartite Agreement. But despite its impeccable record, the LCP was the only party of the former coalition of leftist and nationalist parties, the Lebanese National Movement, that found itself empty-handed in the Syrian-dominated political order since 1990. Of the leading figures of the Lebanese National Movement who are still politically active, George Hawi, the LCP head from 1972 to 1992 and the leading figure of the left since the late 1960s, was the only one who was neither appointed in parliament to fill one of the 40 vacant seats in 1991 nor in the cabinet. Nor have other party members gained seats in the three parliamentary elections since 1992. The LCP and the Kata'ib were the two parties that seriously sought to assess their performance in the last two or three decades and to introduce change in the organization, the political orientation, and discourse of their respective parties. (27) Instigated by the political setback since the end of the war and by the collapse of the Soviet Union and the failure of the Communist model, the LCP launched a movement of reform in the sixth party congress in 1992. The reformist group, known as the "Democratic Leftist Current," sought to steer the party away form the rigid Marxist model and from the notion of "democratic centralism" that generally characterized Communist parties. The reformists called for internal democracy in the party's decision-making process and advocated the revival of party ties to its traditional base, notably labor unions and students, but were opposed by the old guard who considered that internal cohesion was far more important than political pluralism in the party. This attempt reached a deadlock in the eighth party congress in 1999 when the old guard regained the upper-hand and, as a result, several reformists left the party or are no longer active. In fact, the number of participants dropped from about 8500 in the LCP sixth congress to about 3500 in the eighth congress. (28) The reformist attempt initiated by the Kata'ib Party fared no better than that of the LCP. The Kata'ib predicament is greater than that of the LCP since, for many years, the Kata'ib was the "ruling party" in wartime "East Beirut." Under the leadership of George Saade, the Kata'ib launched a reformist program in its nineteenth party congress in 1993. The aim was to open up to political parties and leaders with whom the Kata'ib was at odds during the war, to revive ties with its base, and to draw the line with the Lebanese Forces, one year after Samir Geagea's failure to reach party leadership. The congress' slogan, "democratic renewal," found its way to implementation with the adoption of direct elections of the party leadership from party members. But as the new electoral law led to internal fragmentation in the 1994 elections, it was amended in the 1995 twentieth party congress and governed party elections in 1997 and 1999. These measures, however, did not help to end divisions in the party, which aggravated following Saade's death in 1998 and Amin Gemayel's attempt to regain control over the party. The election of Amin Gemayel's son, Pierre, to Parliament in summer 2000, and the loss of Saade's successor as party head in 1998-2000, Mounir al-Hajj, who ran in the same electoral district as Pierre Gemayel, deepened the divide. Another reformist attempt was that of the SSNP, initiated by Yusuf al-Ashqar who headed the party in 1974 and, more recently, in 1992. A1-Ashqar's central idea revolved around the concept of civil society/the civil state and emphasized the differentiation between political forces seeking to create a non-confessional democratic civil society and those opposed to it. (29) He also called for the reform of the sources of authority in the party thus advocating democratic practice to reform the party and achieve its objectives. A1-Ashqar's endeavor to renew the party and to break the rigidity that has characterized it for many years faced a strong opposition, particularly from former militia leaders and party officials holding government office, and that led him to resign from the party leadership in 1994. One notable exception in party-based politics since 1990 is Hizballah. Founded in the mid-1980s, Hizballah is a relative newcomer to the party scene in Lebanon. A "young" and dynamic party, Hizballah belongs to the "third generation" of Lebanese parties that emerged during the war. A rival of Amal, Hizballah quickly asserted itself as the largest party in the Shi'i community. On all party indicators mentioned above, Hizballah has done better than other parties since the end of the war: it has expanded rapidly in all Shi'i regions of the country, was able to attract a large following, especially among the youth, gained credibility as the party of the armed resistance against Israeli occupation in the south, and has access to large financial resources largely from Iran, which enabled the party to establish welfare institutions and to run an influential television station (al-Manar)--the only Arabic-language satellite television station controlled by an Islamist party in the Middle East. In a way, Hizballah is the only party in Lebanon whose success is measured more by the large measure of autonomy it has from government authorities in political and security affairs rather than from the power it exercises in government. But Hizballah's uniqueness as a political party or, more accurately, as a nonstate actor lies in its dual status as a political party and militia operating with the backing of three states: Lebanon, Syria, and Iran. No other party in Lebanon or in any other country, democratic or authoritarian, Islamic or secular in the present international system enjoys the kind of status and privileges that Hizballah has had since the end of the war. While non-state actors, be they armed groups espousing a political cause or rebel groups involved in illegal activities, have acted in defiance of the state, Hizballah provides the opposite example of an armed group operating with the full and open backing of the state. And contrary to the case of another non-state actor, the PLO in Lebanon from the late 1960s to 1982-83, which turned the south into a war zone against Israel and established its "Fatah Land" against the will of the Lebanese state, Hizballah has been "delegated" by the Syrian-controlled Lebanese state to engage in war against Israel to liberate south Lebanon and to continue warfare in Shebaa (Shab'a) farms (a territory that Lebanon and Syria claim to be Lebanese while the United Nations confirms that it is Israeli-occupied Syrian territory) even after the withdrawal of Israeli troops from the south in May 2000 in accordance with UN Security Council Resolution 425. It is an anomalous situation, unique in the annals of contemporary state-party relations. In reality, Hizballah has three overlapping faces. One is that of a Shi'i-based Islamist party actively involved in the political process: it participates in elections, engages in clientelist politics, and makes pragmatic alliances and political calculations like any other party seeking to enhance its power and rewards. A second face is that of an ideological party and guerrilla movement engaged in a holy war (jihad) to liberate not only Lebanese territory but also occupied Palestine and to establish an Islamic state in Lebanon inspired by the Iranian model whenever conditions are ripe for that endeavor. The third face is that of a clandestine organization with an international network of resources and agents operating closely with other Islamist groups, both Sunni and Shi'i. This third "face" has given Hizballah an international posture and the label of a "terrorist" party by the United States and other Western countries, especially so in the aftermath of the September 11 attacks in the United States. POLITICAL PARTIES AND THE PRESERVATION OF THE STATUS QUO In the 1960s and 1970s Lebanon's parties were modern parties in terms of the functions they performed in and outside parliament and in the policy issues they pursued. (30) Political parties in the 1990s, by contrast, are "pre-modern" and differ from their counterparts in democratic countries. As the latter increasingly operate as interest groups as much as they seek power and are involved in policy pursuit covering broad non-ideological issues, Lebanon's parties are hostage to ideological rigidity and are generally detached from concerns that preoccupy the general public. Issues like governance, freedom of expression, human rights, and foreign policy do not figure on the agenda of political parties and, when they do, they are given low priority. Unable to relate to the "working classes" and to defend their interests in a divided and inactive labor union movement,31 and unable to compete with Hizballah's maximalist platform on the Arab-Israeli conflict, the Lebanese Communist Party has run out of causes. Likewise, the Progressive Socialist Party has become a Druzebased party, criticized by Jumblatt himself for its rigid and archaic structure.32 The SSNP, for its part, has maintained its discourse on Syrian nationalism, though colored with Arabism, while focusing on "the continous struggle against the Jews in occupied Palestine." And as the Ba'th Party clings to Arab unity "to achieve the common aspirations of the Arab people," Hizballah seeks to create a "Muslim society" of its own and to liberate occupied territories in Lebanon and Palestine. Ironically, the parties that challenged the status quo and called for political and economic change prior to the outbreak of war, notably leftist and nationalist parties, are today the gatekeepers of the status quo. Ironically, the parties of the prewar right are today the leading advocates of political and economic reform. As for the role of parties in parliamentary elections and, by extension, in the preservation of competitive politics, they have performed roles similar to those performed by parties in authoritarian regimes. Since parties are more organized and disciplined political actors than individual politicians, and since elections are largely controlled by government, parties have become an effective instrument in influencing the outcome of elections. This is due to the following reasons. First, the parties that are able to operate freely in elections are those that have close ties with government authorities and Damascus: Hizballah, Amal, SSNP, Ba'th, PSP, A1-Ahbash (the Society of Islamic Philanthropic Projects), Al-Jama'a Al-Islamiyya, and Al-Wa'd. Second, since the formation of electoral lists in large constituencies (ranging from 10 to 28 in the three postwar elections) largely determines the outcome of elections in a simple plurality system, the presence of "loyal" parties in several constituencies shapes electoral alliances between these parties and a large number of candidates, including established politicians. Third, in some constituencies, "loyal" parties form the nucleus of electoral lists, particularly in the South and the Biqa', the two constituencies with Shi'i majority, where Syrian-brokered alliances between Amal and Hizballah have determined the outcome of elections prior to election day. (33) Although "loyal" parties have gained an average of (32) seats in each of the last three elections, they influence the election of over 75 seats through electoral alliances out of parliament's 128 seats. It is important to underlnie the changing sectarian composition of parties in parliament. In prewar Parliaments, party representation was mainly Christian and predominantly Maronite. By contrast, in the postwar period, party representation in Parliament is mainly Shi'i, divided almost equally between Hizballah and Amal. (See Tables 2 and 3) Another role played by parties in favor of strengthening the status quo relates to the role of parties in the deadlocked competition between government and opposition. Present-day opposition in Lebanon is neither similar to opposition in the prewar period nor to opposition in democratic or non-democratic regimes. Four patterns of opposition have emerged since 1990: (1) Opposition exercised by the three "presidents" (president, prime minister, speaker), the so-called Troika, whereby "presidents" veto each other's decisions informally and thus cripple the decision-making process; (2) Opposition within cabinet, that is, between cabinet members loyal to the three "presidents" and/or to Damascus; (3) Opposition outside government by parties and politicians "loyal" to the system; (4) Opposition outside the system targeting not only government policy but also Syria's control over the political process. Since "loyal" parties are not competing in elections on the basis of policy differences between government and opposition as in democratic regimes, competition in practice aims at preserving the parties' share in office. Party platforms are then a function of their interests as proteges of the political order to get access to power and to various clientelist privileges. And since "loyal" parties are neither able nor willing to influence government policy beyond a predetermined ceiling, they would be content to maintain the existing status quo which serves their interests. For Hizballah the aim is to maintain autonomy in areas under its control; for Nabih Berri preserving the speakership along with an extensive network of employment in the public sector is a priority; for the SSNP the aim is to maintain its privileged status in cabinet and parliament, while for Walid Jumblatt his Druze leadership and control over a large parliamentary bloc are a necessity for political survival; as for the two rival Sunni Islamist parties, their political fortunes are largely dependent on their relationship with Damascus. In this way, parties have a stake in maintaining the status quo along with the built-in limitations that obstruct competitive politics and, by extension, the democratic process. NEW FORMS OF POLITICAL ORGANIZATION AND OPPOSITION In this largely predetermined power equation, real opposition politics takes place outside political parties operating under the imposed rules of the game. Other parties and groupings are active within their own political space, and they have generated new forms of political organization and protest. In addition to the Forum for National Action led by former Premier Salim al-Hoss established in the early 1990s, other groupings were formed over the last two years: the Democratic Forum led by former deputy Habib Sadiq, the National Gathering for Salvation and Change formed in 2001 and led by former Nasirite deputy Najah Wakim, the Democratic Renewal Movement led by deputy Nassib Lahoud, the Qornet Shehwan Gathering, and the Gathering of the Constitution and the Pact made up of former deputies involved in the making of the Ta'if Agreement. Moreover, three "loyal" parties were established in 2000-2001: The Lebanese Democratic Party led by Druze deputy and minister Talal Arslan, the Lebanese Democratic Front led by former head of the Maronite League Ernest Karam, and the Lebanese Forces Party led by Fouad Malek. Arslan's Druze-based party is a rival to Jumblatt's PSP, and Karam's party is a gathering of notables. Of the three parties, the legalization of the Lebanese Forces Party, eight years after its banning, has a well-defined agenda: to provide a "loyal" substitute to the Geagea-led Lebanese Forces. Geagea denounced Malek's party in a statement issued from prison and he retains the support of the majority of activists and sympathizers of the Lebanese Forces. The most effective and thus the most targeted opposition group has been the Qornet Shehwan Gathering (QSG). Established in April 2001, the QSG includes four political parties (the National Liberal Party led by Dory Chamoun, the "unofficial" Kata'ib Party loyal to Amin Gemayel and Elie Karame, the Lebanese Forces loyal to Samir Geagea, and the National Bloc led by Carlos Edde) as well as several independent politicians, including eight members of parliament. (34) The QSG was the first major attempt since the end of the war to bring together parties and politicians representing a large spectrum of views in the Christian community. Although initially viewed as a temporary coalition of oddities, the QSG emerged as the major opposition force in the country in the last two years. Three features have characterized the QSG as an opposition coalition: (1) it adopted the political discourse of the Maronite Patriarch Nasrallah Sfeir on the need to implement the Ta'if Agreement and to establish balanced relations between Lebanon and Syria; (2) it drew its legitimacy from the support of a large segment of the Christian community, which felt targeted politically since the end of the war; (3) it called for national dialogue and sought to build bridges with Muslim leaders on the Ta'if platform and was initially backed by Walid Jumblatt and by other Muslim leaders. As the QSG gained momentum, particularly following the historic reconciliation between Christians and Druze during Maronite Patriarch Nasrallah Sfeir's visit to the Shuf Mountain and meeting with Walid Jumblatt in early August 2001, government authorities responded by a massive crackdown on three member parties of the QSG leading to the detention of over 200 student activists and the arrest of Toufic Hindi, the Lebanese Forces representative in the QSG. Charged of a plot to divide up the army and of establishing ties with Israel, Hindi received a fifteen-month prison sentence. Hindi's detention and subsequent release were politically motivated. Arm-twisting between government and the QSG continued and reached a peak following the election of the candidate backed by QSG in the by-election in the Matn district in June 2002. The election of Gabriel al-Murr (the uncle of the current Interior Minister, Elias Murr, and the brother of the former Interior Minister, Michel Murr) was annulled four months later by the Constitutional Court which ruled the election of another candidate receiving less than 2 percent of the vote. Murr's television station (MTV) and radio station, which employed over four hundred people, were shut down in September 2002 by a court order for alleged violations of the 2000 electoral law. These rulings, which clearly indicated the politicization of the judiciary, were criticized by the Bar Association, human rights groups, and the European Union. The two taboo issues raised by the QSG--the phased withdrawal of Syrian troops and national reconciliation on the basis of the Ta'if Agreement--led the government to mobilize all its resources, both legal and illegal, to neutralize the QSG and to divide it from within. The government's aim has been to bring back the debate to its pre-2000 ceiling by removing the question of Syrian hegemony from media attention and by preventing any rapprochement between representative Christian and Muslim leaders. In so doing, political debate would be confined to domestic issues of a non-political nature and to the frequent squabbling among the presidential "Troika" over political and financial deals. CONCLUSION In over eighty years of uninterrupted activism by political parties, Lebanon's parties have had a unique experience in comparison with political parties in Arab countries. In prewar Lebanon, parties of all political and ideological persuasions were able to broaden their base and influence policy, while during the war militias were de facto ruling parties in the areas they controlled. Over a decade since the end of the war, parties have yet to recover from internalized war-time practices. Those parties that attempted to make the transition from militias to parties were not always successful, while others were neither able nor willing to make the transition. With the exception of Hizballah, the deepest crisis faced by parties lies in their failure to provide an alternative for political activism, particularly for the youth, better than that offered by non-partisan politicians. In short, parties have lost their prewar moral claim that they presented a form of political organization superior to that of traditional" politicians and that they were the vehicle for reform and democratic change. They are, in other words, parties in search of partisans. The political order that emerged since 1990 has not helped parties to perform these functions. In a political system that restricts foreign policy to a few slogans and domestic policy to constant feuding between politicians competing for privileged access to Damascus, political pluralism has a predetermined margin, and competition between government and opposition is confined to that margin. Under the present rules of the game, political parties seek to maintain the status quo irrespective of its damaging impact on political pluralism and the democratic process. In this way, parties in postwar Lebanon are performing functions similar to those performed by parties in authoritarian regimes. (35) TABLE 1: Major Parties in Postwar Lebanon *
* Other smaller parties are active, including three Armenian parties. ** Hizballah was unofficially founded in 1982. TABLE 2:
TABLE 3: Parties in Parliament by Sect (1972-2000)
(1.) For a comprehensive work on political parties in prewar Lebanon, see Michael W. Suleiman, Political Parties in Lebanon, The Challenge of a Fragmented Political Culture (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1967). (2.) See Shawqat Salim Shtai, Al-Shuyu 'iyun wa al-Kata 'ib: Tajribat al-Tarbiya al-Hizbiyya fi Lubnan [The Communists and the Kata 'ib: The Experience of Party Education in Lebanon] (Beirut: Mu'assassat al-Intishar al-'Arabi, 1997), pp. 475-498. (3.) See, for example, Giovanni Sartori, Parties and Party Systems: A Framework for Analysis, Vol. I (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976); Alan Ware, Political Parties and Party Systems (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996). (4.) On the Kata'ib Party, see John P. Entelis, Pluralism and Party Transformation in Lebanon: AlKata'ib 1936-1970 (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1974); Frank Stoakes, "The Supervigilantes: The Lebanese Kataeb Party as Builder, Surrogate and Defender of the State" Middle Eastern Studies, 11 (October 1975): pp. 215-236. On the Progressive Socialist Party, see Nazih Richani, Dilemmas of Democracy and Political Change in Sectarian Societies: The Case of the Progressive Socialist Party 1949-1996 (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1998); on the SSNP, see Labib Zuwiyya Yamak, The Syrian Social Nationalist party, An Ideological Analysis (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1966). (5.) See Fares Shtai, Al-Hizb al- Taqaaddumi al-Ishtiraki 1949-1975 [The Progressive Socialist Party 1949-1975], 2 vols. (Al-Mukhtara: Al-Dar al- Taqaddumiyya, 1989). (6.) See Augustus Richard Norton, Amal and The Shia: Struggle for the Soul of Lebanon (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1987); Fouad Ajami, The Vanished Imam: Musa al-Sadr and the Shia of Lebanon (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1986). (7.) Maurice Duverger, Les Partis Politiques [Political Parties] (Paris: Librairie Armand Colin, 1961): 322-332. (8.) On the concepts of Greater Syria, see Daniel Pipes, Greater Syria: The History of an Ambition (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990). (9.) See Eyal Zisser, Lebanon: The Challenge of Independence (London: I.B. Tauris, 2000), pp. 1-40. (10.) See Farid el Khazen, The Breakdown of the State in Lebanon 1967-1976 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2000): pp. 73-86. (11.) See Walid Nuwayhid, "Naqd al-Hizb al-Suri al-Qawmi al-Ijtima 'i" ["Critique of the SSNP"], Dirasat 'Arabiyya No. 7 (May 1973): 32-54, and 'Abdullah Sa'adeh, Awraq Qawmiyya, Mudhakarat al-Duktur 'Abdullah Sa'ada [Nationalist Papers: The Memoirs of Dr. 'Abdullah Sa'adeh]. (12.) See John Donohue, "Conflit a l'Universite Americaine de Beyrouth", ["Conflict at AUB"] Travaux et Jours (April-June 1971): pp. 101-113. (13.) On the war years, see Theodor Hanf, Coexistence in Wartime Lebanon, Decline of a State and Rise of a Nation (London: The Centre For Lebanese Studies and I.B. Tauris, 1993). (14.) See As'ad Abu Khalil, "Druze, Sunni and Shiite Political Leadership in Present-Day Lebanon," Arab Studies Quarterly Vol. 7, (Fall 1985), pp. 28-58; Lewis Snider, "The Lebanese Forces: Their Origins and Role in Lebanon's Politics", Middle East Journal, Vol. 38, No. 1 (Winter 1984), pp. 1-33. (15.) Joseph Abu Khalil, Qissat al-Mawarina fi al-Harb, Sira Dhatiyya [The Story of the Maronites in the War: A Personal Account] (Beirut: Sharikat al-Matbu'at li'l-Tawzi' wa al-Nashr, 1990): 365-404. (16.) See Waddah Sharara, Dawlat Hizballah, Ladman Mujtama'an Islamiyyan [Hizballah's State: Lebanon an Islamic Society] (Beirut: Dar al-Nahar, 1996); Amal Saad-Gorayeb, Hizbollah: Politics and Religion (London: Pluto Press, 2002). Augustus Richard Norton, Hizballah of Lebanon: Extremist Ideals vs Mundane Politics (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1999). (17.) Interview with Lakhdar Ibrahimi, Arab Tripartite Committee representative, Al-Mustaqbal, June 16,1999. (18.) On the Ta'if Agreement, see Joseph Maila, The Document of National Understanding: A Commentary (Oxford: Center for Lebanese Studies, 1992). (19.) On that period, see Williams Harris, Faces of Lebanon, Sects, Wars, and Global Extensions (Princeton: Markus Wiener Publishers, 1997), pp. 243-278. (20.) Elizabeth Picard, The Demobilization of the Lebanese Militias (Oxford: Centre for Lebanese Studies, 1999). (21.) See the account of former President Elias Hrawi on Geagea's detention in Elias Hrawi, 'Awdat al-Jumhuriyya, min el-Duwaylat ila al- Dawla [Return of the Republic: From the Enclaves to the State], (Beirut: Dar al-Nahar, 2002), pp. 362-364. (22.) See Farid el Khazen, Intikhabat Lubnan Ma ba'd Al-Harb, 1992,1996, 2000: Dimuqratiyya Bila Khayar [Postwar Lebanese Elections, 1992, 1996, 2000: Democracy without Choice], (Beirut: Dar al-Nahar, 2000). (23.) See Habib C. Malik, Between Damascus and Jerusalem. Lebanon And Middle East Peace, Policy Paper No. 45 (Washington: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2000), pp. 25-45. (24.) See Nuhad Hashishu, Al-Ahzab fi Lubnan [The Parties in Lebanon] (Beirut: Markaz al-Dirasat al-Istratijiyya wa al-Buhuth wa al-Tawthiq, 1998). (25.) Shawqat Shtai, "Al-Iltizam al-Hizbi wa al-Wad' al-Multabis: Hizb al-Kata'ib wa al-Hizb al-Shuyu'i" [Party Commitment and the Ambiguous Position: the Kata'ib and Communist Parties"], in Joseph Bahut and Shawqi Duwaihi (eds.) Al-Hayat al-'Amma fi Lubnan: Taghayyurat al-Siyassi wa Tashkilatuhu [Public Life in Lebanon: Political Change and its Manifestation] (Beirut: CERMOC, 1997), p.77. (26.) The belated "reward" came recently with the appointment of Karim Pakradouni in 2003 as Minister of State for Administrative Development. (27.) For more details, see Farid el Khazen, Al-Ahzab al-Siyasiyya fi Lubnan, Hudud al-Tajriba al-Dimuqratiya [Political Parties in Lebanon: The Limits of the Democratic Experiment],(Beirut: Al Markaz al-Lubnani Lidirasat, 2002):, pp. 67-143. (28.) El Khazen, Al-Ahzab al-Siyasiyya, p. 109. (29.) Al-Hizb al-Suri al-Qawmi al-Ijtima'i, 'Umdat al-Idha'a wa al-I'lam, Bayan Ra'is al-Hizb al-Amin Yusuf al-Ashqar,[Announcement of Party President Amin Yusuf al-Ashqar], October 15, 1992. (30.) See Russell J.Dalton and Martin P. Wattenberg (eds), Parties Without Partisans. Political Change In Advanced Industrial Democracies (Oxford: Oxford Uviversity Press, 2000): 261-285. (31.) Lebanon's Labor Union, which continued to be effective and united during the war years, split along political and sectarian lines and is now dominated by parties loyal to government and has, as a result, lost its autonomy and effectiveness. (32.) Al-Nahar, April 10, 2001 (33.) See Nqula Nassif and Rosanna Bu Monsif, Al-Masrah wa al-Kawalees: Intikhabat 1996fi Fusuliha (Beirut: Dar al-Nahar, (1996): 18-196. (34.) See Liqa' Qornet Shehwan fi Sanatihi al-Ula: Mawaqif wa Bayanat [The Qornet Shehwan Meeting in its First Year: Positions and Announcements (April 2001-April 2002) (Qornet Shehwan Group: No Place, No Date [2002]). The National Bloc Party withdrew from QSG in November 2002 and its three representatives resigned from the party and stayed in QSG. (35.) See Paul Brooker, Non-Democratic Regimes: Theory, Government and Politics (London: Macmillan Press LTD, 2000): 226-255. Farid el Khazen is professor and chair of the Department of Political Studies and Public Adminstration at the American University of Beirut. He is the author of numerous publications, including most recently The Breakdown of the State in Lebanon 1967-1976 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2000), Intikhabat Lubnan Ma ba'd Al-Harb, 1992, 1996, 2000: Dimuqratiyya Bila Khayar [Postwar Lebanese Elections, 1992, 1996, 2000: Democracy without Choice], (Beirut: Dar al-Nahar, 2000), and Al-Ahzab al-Siyasiyya fi Lubnan, Hudud al-Tajriba al-Dimuqratiya [The Political Parties in Lebanon, Limits of the Democratic Experiment](Beirut: Al-Markaz al-Lubnani li-Dirasat, 2002). -- End -- |